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Suppressing unwanted memories can impair their later recall. Recent work shows that this forgetting is
achieved by at least two mechanisms supported by distinct neural systems: thought substitution and direct
suppression (Benoit & Anderson, 2012). Here, we examined whether direct suppression, thought to be
achieved by down-regulation of hippocampal activity, can disrupt memory of aversive scenes, and, if so,
whether this disruption is linked to people’s perception of their ability to control intrusive thoughts. We
presented participants with strong naturalistic reminders to aversive scenes and asked them to either
covertly retrieve or directly suppress the associated scenes. Later, participants were cued with the
reminders and asked to recall the scenes in detail. Direct suppression reduced recall probability of the
scenes and also reduced the number of details recalled, even when scenes were remembered. Deficits in
recall arose for minor details but also for details central to each scene’s gist. Participants with higher
self-perceived control abilities over intrusive thoughts showed greater forgetting than did those reporting
lower levels of control. These findings suggest that inhibitory processes underlying direct suppression
can disrupt retention of aversive visual memories and link those processes to individual differences in
control over intrusive thoughts in everyday life. These findings reinforce the possibility that inhibition
may be less efficient in people likely to acquire posttraumatic stress disorder in the wake of a traumatic
experience.
Keywords: memory inhibition, intrusive memories, direct suppression, PTSD
People sometimes encounter reminders of experiences that they
would rather not think about. When this happens, they often try to
stop retrieval to exclude the unwanted memory from awareness. The
ability to suppress retrieval in this manner may play an important role
in successfully adapting memory after a traumatic experience. Intru-
sive memories are common after traumatic life events (Brewin, Greg-
ory, Lipton, & Burgess, 2010; Ehlers, Hackmann, & Michael, 2004),
as are efforts to suppress them. Although intrusions gradually become
less frequent for most people (Ehlers, 2010), for a significant minor-
ity, intrusions persist, causing significant distress and impairment
(Ehlers et al., 2004; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson,
1995). Indeed, prolonged intrusions are the hallmark symptom of
posttraumatic stress disorder (hereinafter, PTSD) and are considered a
precursor to the disorder (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). A
fundamental question is why many people learn to control intrusive
memories over time, often recovering on their own, whereas others
experience persistent intrusions that often require treatment. Studying
the fundamental mechanisms of memory control may elucidate how
people regulate intrusive memories and reveal the mechanisms of
successful adaptation and of PTSD.
This article was published Online First April 21, 2014.
Charlotte S. Küpper, MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cam-
bridge, United Kingdom, and Department of Clinical Psychology and
Psychotherapy, Freie Universität Berlin; Roland G. Benoit, Department
of Psychology, Harvard University; Tim Dalgleish, MRC Cognition and
Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, United Kingdom; Michael C. Ander-
son, MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, Cambridge, United
Kingdom, and Behavioural and Clinical Neurosciences Institute, Uni-
versity of Cambridge.
This article has been published under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/), which per-
mits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided
the original author and source are credited. Copyright for this article is retained
by the author(s). Author(s) grant(s) the American Psychological Association the
exclusive right to publish the article and identify itself as the original publisher.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Michael C.
Anderson, MRC Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit, 15 Chaucer Road, Cam-
bridge CB2 7EF, England. E-mail: michael.anderson@mrc-cbu.cam.ac.uk
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General © 2014 The Author(s)
2014, Vol. 143, No. 4, 1443–1449 0096-3445/14/$12.00 DOI: 10.1037/a0036518
1443The ability to suppress retrieval of unwanted memories is often
studied using the think/no-think (TNT) paradigm (Anderson & Green,
2001). In this task, participants first study cue–target pairs. They then
either repeatedly retrieve (think items) or stop retrieval (no-think
items) of the studied targets when given their reminder cues. A third
group of items is neither retrieved nor suppressed (baseline items).
After this think/no-think task, memory for all pairs is tested. A large
body of data indicates that repeatedly stopping retrieval typically
reduces recall for no-think items relative to think and baseline items
on the final test (e.g., Anderson & Green, 2001;Anderson et al., 2004;
Depue, Curran, & Banich, 2007; Levy & Anderson, 2012; for re-
views, see Anderson & Hanslmayr, in press;Anderson & Huddleston,
2011). Although most previous studies with this procedure have used
a general “no-think” instruction that does not specify how to stop
retrieval, recent work has tried to isolate distinct forgetting mecha-
nisms with more precise instructions. Benoit and Anderson (2012),
for example, contrasted thought substitution (i.e., retrieving alterna-
tive associations to reminder cues) with direct suppression as ways of
excluding a memory from awareness (Bergström, de Fockert, &
Richardson-Klavehn, 2009). Direct suppression instructions spe-
cifically ask participants to not retrieve distracting thoughts and to
purge memories from awareness if they intrude, effectively asking
participants to shut down all retrieval in response to cues. Al-
though both instructions led to similar forgetting, they engaged
distinct neural systems: Whereas thought substitution engaged left
ventrolateral prefrontal cortex to retrieve substitute memories, and
its activation predicted increased retrieval-related activity in the
hippocampus, effective connectivity analysis indicated that direct
suppression recruited right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex to down-
regulate hippocampal activity and inhibit conscious recollection
(Benoit & Anderson, 2012). Thus, direct suppression instructions
are thought to better isolate inhibitory control processes acting on
hippocampally mediated traces than general no-think instructions,
which may include some component of thought substitution.
Although it is possible that inhibitory control reduces traumatic
intrusions (e.g., Aupperle, Melrose, Stein, & Paulus, 2012; Levy &
Anderson, 2008; Wessel, Overwijk, Verwoerd, & de Vrieze,
2008), the case for whether the mechanisms engaged by direct
suppression instructions impair complex, aversive memories is
unclear. On the one hand, all direct suppression studies (Benoit &
Anderson, 2012; Bergström et al., 2009; Hanslmayr, Leipold,
Pastötter, & Bäuml, 2009) have used word pairs and only one (van
Schie, Geraerts, & Anderson, 2013) has used emotional items. It is
surely easier to suppress emotional words than traumatic intru-
sions. Traumatic intrusions often consist of brief images, rather
than verbal thoughts (Ehlers et al., 2004; Holmes & Mathews,
2010), and recall of both aversive and pictorial stimuli is enhanced
compared to that of neutral and verbal material (Holmes &
Mathews, 2010; Nowicka, Marchewka, Jednorog, Tacikowski, &
Brechmann, 2011; Payne & Corrigan, 2007; Quinlan, Taylor,
& Fawcett, 2010; Shepard, 1967). On the other hand, no study
showing suppression-induced forgetting for emotional material,
such as autobiographical memories (Noreen & MacLeod, 2013),
aversive scenes (Depue, Banich, & Curran, 2006; Depue et al.,
2007), or negative word pairs (Hertel & McDaniel, 2010; Joor-
mann, Hertel, Brozovich, & Gotlib, 2005; Joormann, Hertel, Lem-
oult, & Gotlib, 2009), has used direct suppression instructions,
making it unclear how much forgetting was caused by thought
substitution. More broadly, it remains unclear whether the inhibi-
tion process measured with direct suppression is engaged in nat-
urally arising cases of memory control in everyday life.
To establish inhibitory control as a component process in how
people contend with intrusive memories, it is important to show
that, in principle, this process could be effective in controlling
aversive memories in real life circumstances. The present study
thus had two goals central to establishing direct suppression as a
model of how people control unwanted memories in everyday life.
First, we sought to determine whether direct suppression impairs
retention of aversive visual memories that are strongly cued by
reminders. In real traumatic situations, incidental objects present at
the scene often become associated to the event, and when people
encounter similar objects later, these can trigger unwanted mem-
ories (Ehlers & Clark, 2000; Ehlers et al., 2002). To model this
feature, we modified Anderson and Green’s (2001) TNT paradigm
and used materials adapted from those employed by Depue et al.
(2007). Unlike Depue et al., however, we used object–scene rather
than face–scene pairs, to increase the ecological validity of the
suppression task. In particular, to simulate natural situations asso-
ciated with involuntary trauma recall, we selected objects as cues
that strongly resembled an incidental object embedded in its paired
scene. Thus, cues were considerably more powerful and natural-
istic than arbitrary pairs often used in TNT studies (see, however,
Hertel & Gerstle, 2003; Hertel & McDaniel, 2010, for verbal
studies that also create powerful cues via mental imagery encoding
of emotional items).
Second, we examined the relationship between direct suppres-
sion and memory control abilities that people report experiencing
in everyday life. Large variability exists in individuals’ perceptions
about their ability to control unwanted intrusions (Luciano, Alga-
rabel, Tomas, & Martinez, 2005), and self-report measures of this
variation strongly predict symptoms such as anxiety, depression,
and obsessional thinking (Peterson, Klein, Donnelly, & Renk,
2009; Williams et al., 2010). If these self-reports also predicted the
forgetting induced by direct suppression in the TNT procedure, it
would suggest both that direct suppression contributes to everyday
memory control and that variations in it may be related to psycho-
logical symptoms. Such variation in suppression ability might be
observed not merely in recall probability but also in the quality and
specificity of memories (as shown, for example, by Fawcett,
Taylor, & Nadel, 2013; Noreen & MacLeod, 2013; Stephens,
Braid, & Hertel, 2012). Thus, we asked participants to describe
their memories of the aversive scenes in detail on the final test.
These descriptions allowed us to determine whether participants
could recall the suppressed memories at all and whether suppres-
sion may affect the quality of the memories recalled in a graded
fashion.
Method
Participants
Twenty-four native English speaking volunteers from the MRC
Cognition and Brain Sciences Unit participant panel (age 18–30
years; M  22.25 years; 18 female) participated in exchange for
payment.
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The stimuli were 60 object–scene pairs. Scenes fit trauma
themes such as combat exposure, physical and sexual assault,
witnessing injuries and death, natural disasters, and serious
accidents (see American Psychiatric Association, 2000; Kessler
et al., 1995) and were taken from the International Affective
Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 2008) and
online sources. Cues were photographs of familiar objects
(taken from Brady, Konkle, Alvarez, & Oliva, 2008) set against
a white background. Each object resembled an item embedded
in its paired scene but was not intrinsically related to the scene’s
gist, so that one could not guess the scene given the cue without
having initially seen them together (see Figure 1). Of the 60
pairs, 12 served as fillers, with the remaining 48 constituting
critical pairs (16 think, 16 baseline, 16 no-think items). The
three sets were matched on valence and arousal of the scenes.
Assignment of sets to the conditions was counterbalanced
across participants.
Thought Control Ability Questionnaire (TCAQ; Luciano et
al., 2005). The TCAQ assesses the perceived ability to exert
control over intrusions. Participants indicate whether they agree
with each of 25 statements (e.g., “I manage to have control over
my thoughts even when under stress” and “I get rid of uncomfort-
able thoughts or images almost effortlessly”) on a 5-point scale
from 1 (completely disagree)t o5( completely agree), with higher
scores reflecting better control ability. The measure has a satisfac-
tory test–retest reliability (r  .88) and a high internal consistency
(Cronbach‘s alpha  .92).
Procedure
The modified TNT procedure (Anderson & Green, 2001) con-
sisted of three phases: a study phase, the TNT phase, and a final
test phase (see Figure 2).
Study phase. Participants studied each object–scene pair for
6 s (interstimulus interval [ISI]  1 s). Test–feedback cycles
followed, in which each object appeared for up to 4 s (ISI  750
ms) and participants indicated, by pressing a button, whether they
could recall the scene. If they could, three scenes appeared, and
they had to select the correct one within 4 s. Foil scenes were
drawn from other studied pairs to ensure that a scene’s familiarity
could not be used as a recognition cue. Participants then received
the pair again for 2.5 s, as feedback. This procedure was repeated
until participants reached 60% or higher recognition. To facilitate
learning, the pairs were trained in two blocks of 30. After all pairs
were trained, a final test was given without feedback, to assess
which pairs had been learned.
Think/no-think phase. Participants next performed a TNT
task composed of think and no-think trials. On all trials, a cue
object appeared for 3 s, surrounded by a colored frame, followed
by a varying fixation cross (ISI  2s 600 ms). For green-framed
objects (think), participants were asked to retrieve the associated
scene in as much detail as possible; for red-framed objects (no-
think), they suppressed retrieval of the scene. On no-think trials,
participants received direct suppression instructions (Benoit &
Anderson, 2012; Bergström et al., 2009). Specifically, they were
told to focus on the cue while blocking out all thoughts of the
associated scene without engaging in distracting activity. Think
and no-think cues were pseudo-randomly intermixed with the
restriction that no four objects belonging to the same condition
appeared in succession.
To assess understanding of the instructions, we asked partici-
pants to complete two short practice phases on fillers. They were
then briefly refreshed (1.5 s exposure per pair) on all pairs before
the TNT phase. During the TNT phase, participants were presented
with 32 object cues, 16 each from the think and no-think condi-
tions. The TNT phase was split into five blocks (separated by 30
s breaks) with each object presented twice in each block, yielding
10 think or no-think repetitions per object.
Final test phase. Finally, participants’ memory for all scenes
was tested. Participants were first presented with six filler objects,
followed by 48 critical cues (without a colored frame), with cues
presented in a blocked randomization scheme. Each object was
displayed for 15 s (ISI  3 s). Participants were asked to recall
every scene in as much detail as possible, describing each scene so
that it could be uniquely identified. The descriptions were re-
corded.
After the test, participants rated, on a 5-point Likert scale
(never  0; always  4), how often, overall, they used thought
substitution and direct suppression for controlling their memories,
and completed the TCAQ.
Dependent Measures
Participants’ descriptions were scored on three measures. In
the identification measure, a description was scored as correct
if it included enough detail so that the scene could be identified
(based on the measure introduced by Depue et al., 2006). In the
detail measure, descriptions were divided into small segments
that independently conveyed information, and the absolute
number of correct details was counted. Finally, in the gist
measure, we defined gist as any element pertaining to the
scene’s story that could not be changed or excluded without
changing the main theme. For each scene, two independent
judges determined specific elements necessary to the gist (rang-
ing from two to four per scene, M  3.10, SD  0.69), and a
description was scored as correct only if it included all neces-
sary elements. The descriptions were scored by two indepen-
dent coders, both blind to the conditions. Interrater agreement,
Figure 1. A representative cue–target pair, consisting of a negative scene
and a neutral object that resembled an item embedded as a detail in its
paired scene. Images are from the International Affective Picture System
(Lang et al., 2008) and from Brady et al. (2008). See the online article for
the color version of this figure.
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fication: r  1; detail: r  .91; gist: r  .98).
Results
Only pairs that participants learned were analyzed (all rele-
vant results were significant based on all pairs as well). Each
measure was submitted to a repeated-measures analysis of
variance (ANOVA) with condition (baseline, think, no-think) as
a within-subject factor. Greenhouse–Geisser corrections were
used where sphericity assumptions were violated as indicated
by Mauchly‘s test. Significance level was set at .05.
Final Test Performance
All three measures showed evidence of suppression-induced
forgetting. On the identification measure, performance was
extremely high, indicating that our object cues powerfully re-
instated the scenes (see Figure 3a). Nevertheless, in line with
previous findings (Depue et al., 2006, 2007), suppression re-
duced recall for no-think images (M  93%) relative to baseline
and think images (M  99%, in each case). The ANOVA
revealed a main effect of condition, F(1.08, 24.76)  9.32, p 
.005, 
2  .29, and a planned contrast showed that this partly
reflected below baseline forgetting of no-think items, F(1,
23)  9.72, p  .005, 
2  .30.
Importantly, participants also recalled fewer scene details
(see Figure 3b), as revealed by a reliable main effect of condi-
tion, F(1.33, 30.50)  14.92, p  .0001, 
2  .39 (M  11.12,
11.51, and 9.76 for baseline, think, and no-think, respectively),
and a planned contrast showing that participants recalled fewer
details for no-think than baseline items, F(1, 23)  18.25, p 
.0001, 
2  .44. Strikingly, 88% of the participants showed this
effect. Below baseline recall of details even arose when we
considered only pairs that participants had correctly identified,
F(1, 23)  8.44, p  .008, 
2  .27, indicating that even
accessible memories were recalled in less detail than they
otherwise would have been.
Does suppression affect retention of a scene’s core meaning
or only minor details? In our gist measure, we observed a trend
for a main effect, F(2, 46)  2.81, p  .07 (M  59%, 58%, and
50% for baseline, think, and no-think, respectively), and, crit-
ically, no-think recall was reduced compared to baseline recall,
F(1, 23)  6.23, p  .020, 
2  .21. This effect was marginally
significant when considering only correctly identified scenes,
F(1, 23)  3.67, p  .068, 
2  .14. Thus, suppression
impaired retention of meaningful elements of the scenes (see
Figure 3c).
Variation by Reported Memory Control Ability
To determine whether forgetting is related to everyday per-
ceptions of memory control, we split our sample into groups
with higher (M  96, SD  9; n  12) and lower (M  66,
SD  16; n  12) self-rated mental control abilities according
to the Thought Control Ability Questionnaire. On the identifi-
cation measure (see Figure 3d), high-control participants
showed more below baseline forgetting (10.5%; p  .05) than
did low-control participants (2.1%; p  .05), F(1, 22)  5.13,
p  .034, 
2  .13. Similarly, high-control participants showed
more suppression of event details (2.2 details; p  .001) than
did lower control participants (0.6 details; p  .05; see Figure
3e), F(1, 22)  7.68, p  .011, 
2  .14. The groups did not
differ in their suppression of gist (see Figure 3f). These results
are echoed in the expected negative correlations of self-rated
mental control with no-think recall for identification and for
details (r  .38 in both cases, p  .05, one-tailed) but not gist
(r  .1).
1 Importantly, participants with low and high thought
control ability did not differ on any measure of initial learning
in the training phase (e.g., number of trials to learn pairs;
1 The correlation between the identification measure and self-reported
control ability reported here reflects the exclusion of a single participant,
whose no-think performance was 3.6 standard deviations below the mean.
Excluding this participant does not affect the significance of any other
relevant result.
Figure 2. Schematic representation of the experimental procedure. In the study phase, participants encoded
object–scene pairs. During the TNT phase, participants directly suppressed some of the scenes (no-think
condition: top image; framed in red online only) and recalled others (think condition: bottom image; framed in
green online only). In a final test, participants were asked to verbally describe all the scenes they had previously
recalled, suppressed, or initially learned but not seen during the TNT phase (i.e., baseline items). TNT 
think/no-think. Images are from the International Affective Picture System (Lang et al., 2008) and from Brady
et al. (2008). See the online article for the color version of this figure.
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This indicates that differences were limited to memory control
and not memory ability more generally.
2
Strategies for Memory Control
Participants reported following our instructions to use direct
suppression. Participants were more likely to report using direct
suppression (M  3.04, SD  0.55) than thought substitution
(M  1.15, SD  0.77) during no-think trials, t(23)  8.91, p 
.000, d  2.89.
Discussion
The current study examined whether aversive images could be
forgotten with direct suppression and, if so, whether such forget-
ting is related to people’s perceptions of their memory control
skills in daily life. Recent work using effective connectivity anal-
ysis has isolated a right dorsolateral–hippocampal network sup-
porting the direct suppression of episodic traces via inhibitory
modulation of hippocampal retrieval processes (Benoit & Ander-
son, 2012; see also Gagnepain, Henson, & Anderson, 2014),
supporting earlier claims about the mechanistic origins of reduced
hippocampal activity during no-think instructions (Anderson et al.,
2004; Depue et al., 2007). Although this mechanism likely con-
tributed to prior instances in which emotional memory was sup-
pressed (e.g., Chen et al., 2012; Depue et al., 2007), those studies
used general no-think instructions (Depue et al., 2006, 2007;
Hertel & McDaniel, 2010; Joormann et al., 2005, 2009; Noreen &
MacLeod, 2013), making it unclear to what extent direct suppres-
sion mediated forgetting. Further, all studies using direct suppres-
sion instructions have used verbal materials (e.g., Benoit & An-
derson, 2012; Bergström et al., 2009; van Schie et al., 2013),
making it unclear whether aversive visual memories could be
disrupted via this mechanism. By using direct suppression instruc-
tions and controlling thought substitution, and by using ecologi-
cally valid, potent reminders to aversive imagery, the present
findings reinforce this earlier work and suggest the viability of
inhibitory control as a mechanism for controlling intrusive imag-
ery.
Prior neuroimaging studies with the think/no-think procedure
have shown that direct suppression significantly reduces both
hemodynamic and electrophysiological markers of episodic recol-
lection. In contrast, retrieving thought substitutes does not cause
such reductions (Benoit & Anderson, 2012) and in fact is associ-
ated with increases on these measures (Bergström et al., 2009).
These findings indicate that, on average, participants do not use
thought substitution when implementing direct suppression in-
2 Although the differences in memory suppression for participants with
low and high thought control ability were reliable, the present study only
had 24 participants, with 12 participants per group. As such, appropriate
caution should be exercised in interpreting these findings, given the small
sample size. However, in an independent, forthcoming study, we replicated
the current differences in memory suppression as a function of self-
perceived thought control ability. Indeed, when those participants are
combined with the current ones (N  42), all of the present conclusions are
strongly supported.
Figure 3. Memory performance in the final test as a function of baseline, think, and no-think conditions. (a)
Percentage of memories correctly identified, (b) absolute number of details correctly recalled, and (c) percentage
of correct gist recall for n  24 participants. Graphs d–f show memory performance separately for participants
with lower (n  12) and higher (n  12) control over everyday intrusions for the (d) identification, (e) details,
and (f) gist measures. Error bars indicate 1 standard error of the mean. Significance levels are represented as
follows:
p  .05.
p  .01.
p  .001. n.s.  not significant.
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experimental reports, which usually confirm very high compliance
with the instruction to not retrieve thought substitutes during direct
suppression. We also observed reports of good compliance in the
present study. Nevertheless, because compliance is rarely perfect,
and because the present study does not have neural indices that
might detect retrieval of thought substitutes, it remains possible
that some of the current suppression effect may reflect uncon-
trolled thought substitution. Given the similarity to prior proce-
dures and findings, however, we suspect that thought substitution
is unlikely to be a major factor, a possibility that will need to be
corroborated with further imaging work.
Our findings further suggest that the inhibitory influence of
direct suppression on hippocampal activity can also partially dis-
rupt a memory, impairing its completeness and clarity, even when
access to an event remains intact. Even when participants could
generally recall the suppressed memory, they recalled fewer event
details (cf. Fawcett et al., 2013; Noreen & MacLeod, 2013; Ste-
phens et al., 2012). Degraded recall was not limited to minor
details but also affected details central to the gist of the scenes.
Such qualitative changes in memory may have clinical implica-
tions. For instance, one might speculate that the capacity to grad-
ually weaken an unpleasant memory and to lose access to painful
details by inhibitory control may gradually reduce distress, anxi-
ety, and perceptions of uncontrollability among trauma survivors.
Whether impaired recall of trauma is a benefit or a weakness is a
matter of perspective, however. It may be important for trauma
survivors to be able to choose to remember a traumatic experience
(see Holmes, James, Kilford, & Deeprose, 2010). However, there
are many situations in which it is unwise to discourage the use of
suppression in regulating intrusions. For example, healthy people
frequently exposed to traumatic situations (e.g., emergency service
workers, military personnel), which they do not wish to intrude
into their personal lives, would benefit from reducing recall of
unpleasant experiences (Dunn, Billotti, Murphy, & Dalgleish,
2009).
Finally, the present findings link direct suppression to people’s
naturally occurring efforts to control unwanted memories, and
further suggest that there is wide variation in this ability that can
be measured. By using a self-report measure of memory control
ability known to predict individual differences in anxiety, depres-
sion, and obsessional thinking (Peterson et al., 2009; Williams et
al., 2010), we found that participants with higher reported control
over everyday intrusions were significantly more effective in sup-
pressing aversive images than were participants with lower re-
ported control. Such variation in ability may reflect underlying
differences in the efficiency of the neural systems that implement
direct suppression. Such variation might arise from differences in
experience at memory control. Indeed, Lyoo et al. (2011) found
that trauma survivors who showed the greatest cortical thickness in
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex one year after the trauma also
showed the largest reductions in PTSD symptom severity and
significantly better recovery over several years. This raises the
possibility that the frontohippocampal modulatory process exhibits
experience-dependent plasticity, contributing to natural variation
in memory control ability of the sort reported by our participants.
Alternatively, such variation may reflect enduring differences in
inhibitory control that portend the likely success a person will have
in suppressing traumatic intrusions. Measuring and recognizing
deficient memory suppression as a vulnerability factor may help to
identify people who are not likely to recover on their own after a
trauma and to guide appropriate intervention approaches (e.g.,
suppression- vs. acceptance-based) to prevent the buildup of the
syndrome (Dunn et al., 2009; Peterson et al., 2009). Regardless of
the source of individual variation, however, the link between
naturally occurring memory control and the forgetting observed
here suggests that understanding the cognitive and neural mecha-
nisms underlying direct suppression offers exciting possibilities
for future research on interventions to assist people recovering
from traumatic life experiences.
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